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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF 1HE
STATE OF UTAH
LETTIE DELL BROCK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DEAN 0. WARD and
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12737

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower court on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $15,000.00 general damages, and $5,145.84 special damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident
involving plaintiff, Lettie Dell Brock, and defendant,
Dean 0. Ward.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the
lower court's judgment and an order directing that
judgment be entered in favor of defendants, no cause
of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of July 17, 1968, at approxi1

mately 7 :05 a.m., the plaintiff, Mrs. Lettie Brock
was driving south at a speed of about 55 miles
hour on U.S. 91, between Brigham City, Utah, and
Ogden, Utah, (R. 138, 144). She was alone in her
car and was driving to work in Ogden just as she had
done at that same time each day, for a period of several months immediately prior to the accident (R.
145, 146). The highway at this point is a four lane
highway, with a center dividing strip
feet wide,
separating the two southbound and two northbound
lanes. Each of the southbound lanes is approximately
11 feet wide (R. 164). The posted speed limit was 65
miles per hour (R. 145, 139). As Mrs. Brock traveled south, she occupied the right hand, or outside
southbound lane of the highway (R. 139). The wea·
ther on this particular morning was clear, and the
roads were dry ( R. 144) . Mrs. Brock testified that
the only problem she had with the weather was a
glare on her windshield caused by the sun which was
just coming over the mountains to the east, but that
she could still see the road ahead of her (R. 147,
149). The road at this point was straight and level
for a distance of at least one mile north of the scene
of the accident (R. 147).
The defendant, Mr. Ward, had been traveling
south driving a dump truck, on the same highway
but had pulled over and stopped on the right shoulder
of the road, upon being waved down by a friend, Mr.
Larsen who had overtaken him (R. 175, 177). Mr.
'
Ward pulled
in behind Mr. Larsen as far over on the
2

right shoulder of the road as he could, but when he
came to a stop, the left portion of his truck was protruding out into the traveled portion of the outside
southbound lane of the road for a distance of about
3 to 31h feet (R. 176, 177). Larsen stopped Ward so
he could ask Ward to pick up a part for a tractor
while he was in Salt Lake City ( R. 175) . Larsen was
standing on the running board of the truck, its motor
was still running and Ward had his foot on the brake
and the right turn signal was flashing when the impact occurred (R. 177, 178). Between the time Ward
stopped and the time of impact one southbound vehicle passed him ( R. 178).
Mrs. Brock first became aware of the defendant's truck when she was one-quarter of a mile from
it, at which time she formed the judgment that the
truck was parked completely off the road, and therefore she made no attempt to apply the brakes or move
into the left hand southbound lane (R. 147, 148, 141).
There were no vehicles between Mrs. Brock and
Ward's truck, in either of the southbound lanes.
There was nothing to prevent Mrs. Brock from moving to the left to avoid the accident (R. 149, 140).
She nevertheless continued in the southbound lane,
and when she came to within 100-150 feet of the
parked truck, the sun came completely up from behind the mountain, causing more of a glare (R. 141,
149, 150). Although the sun's glare increased in
brightness when it came out completely over the
mountain, Mrs. Brock, according to her testimony,
3

could still see the truck at all times, even though it
took a while for her eyes to adjust to the sun's glare
and yet still she failed to apply her brakes or
the left, but maintained her speed at 55 miles per
hour for a distance of 100-150 feet at which time she
crashed into the rear of the parked dump truck (R.
150, 151, 152, 141). From the time plaintiff first
became aware of the truck which was at a point about
one-fourth of a mile away, until impact, she thought
it was completely off the paved portion of the roadway (R. 150, 151).
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant,
Dean 0. Ward, alleging negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff named State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company as a defendant on
the basis of plaintiff's insurance contract with said
company which provides "uninsured automobile coverage" (R. 1, 2). State Farm's liability to plaintiff
in this action, therefore, hinges on the liability of defendant, Dean 0. Ward. The court entered judgment
against State Farm and Ward for $10,000.00, the
limit of liability under the uninsured motorist cov·
erage, and the balance of the judgment is against
Ward only.
Motions were timely made by defendant, State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for
summary judgment, a directed verdict, and a judg·
ment notwithstanding the verdict, which motions
were all denied by the court ( R. 43, 125).
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, OR
AT THE LEAST WAS A CONTRIBUTING
PROXIMATE CAUSE WHICH WOULD BAR
HER RECOVERY.

The plaintiff's negligent conduct in failing to
take any evasive action whatsoever to avoid the dangerous condition, where the dangerous condition must
have been observable in the exercise of ordinary care,
was the sole proximate cause or at least a contributing proximate cause of the accident. Mrs. Brock testified that at all times, while traveling the last onequarter of a mile before the accident, even though the
sun was glaring in her eyes, she was able to clearly see
both the road ahead of her and the parked truck that
she crashed into (R 151, 153).
A case similar to the one at bar was decided by
this court in Hirschbach v. Dubuque Packing Co., 7
Utah 2d 7, 316 P.2d 319 (1957). In that case the
defendant had parked his truck in the westbound
lane of the road at night with the tail lights on. The
road was a two lane highway, separated by a painted
line, and was straight and level at the point where
the accident occurred. The plaintiff, just prior to the
accident was traveling west at about 40 miles per
hour. The driver of plaintiff's vehicle observed the
tail lights on defendant's truck in sufficient time to
have stopped and avoided the collision, but he did not
5

do so because he was under the mistaken impression
that the defendant's vehicle was moving in the same
direction that he was. The lower court granted sum.
mary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the
plaintiff appealed. On appeal the plaintiff argued
that the lights on the defendant's truck had tended to
confuse appellant's driver and to mislead him into
believing that there was a moving vehicle ahead, and
that under such circumstances the issue of the driver's negligence was a question of fact for the jury.
This court rejected that argument stating in 316
P.2d at 320:

''* * * we find no such doubt that the
plaintiff in this case was negligent as a matter
of law. The lights should have warned him
there was an object in front which would have
to be avoided and he should have driven in such
a manner and at a rate of speed that he could
have avoided a collision at any time."
The situation in Hirschbach is not the typical
situation where the driver of a vehicle is "overdriv·
ing" his headlights at night and is not able to stop
for objects in the road that suddenly come into view.
Rather, the driver in Hirschbach saw the truck in
sufficient time to stop, but did not because he formed
the mistaken belief that the truck was moving. These
facts are strikingly similar to the case at bar. Mrs.
Brock also observed the parked truck at a point in
time when she had ample time and opportunity to
avoid the collision, but made no effort to do so (R
147, 140). As justification for her conduct, Mrs.
6

Brock testified that at least partially due to the sun's
glare, she formed the mistaken belief that the truck
was off the road, and further, she somehow continued in this belief right up until the moment of impact
(R. 140, 150). The teaching of Hirschbach is that
in such a situation the driver of a vehicle should drive
"in such a manner and at a rate of speed that he
could have avoided a collision at any time."
In addition, the cases are almost unanimous in
holding that when a driver's vision is impaired (Mrs.
Brock testified that it took several seconds 'for her
eyes to adjust to the sun as it came completely out
over the mountains) (R 141, 150), he must stop or
reduce his rate of speed. In Annotations 22 A.L.R.2d
292, at 300, it states:
"The situation where a motorist proceeding on the highway has his vision interfered
with by glaring or dazzling lights has, in several jurisdictions, been regarded as calling
merely for the application of the general rule
requiring motorists to operate their vehicles so
as to be able to stop within the assured clear
distance ahead. Where this rule is applied, it is
usually said that the motorist blinded by lights
must either stop (if his vision is cut off completely) or proceed at such a rate of speed and
with such control of his vehicle as to be able to
stop in time to avoid any discernible object in
the road ahead."
In Nagata v. Kahului Development Co., 420
P.2d 103 (Hawaii 1966), the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that a motorist who proceeded down a street for
7

over_ 200 feet while her vision was impaired by bright
sunlight from the rising sun, which was low in the
sky, and who collided with a large trailer which had
stopped along a curb was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, in view of her failure to take any
positive action in regard to her impaired visibility.
The court, at page 108, stated:
'''A motorist who proceeds when his vision
has been impaired, after having had time to
adjust to the situation but failing to do so is
chargeable with contributory negligence a
matter of law."
And further at 108, 109, the court stated:
"The standard of care has been generally
held to be the same whether the impairment
of vision is caused by sunlight or oncoming
headlights. It would seem, however, that sun·
light is inherently a pervasive condition as to
which greater foreseeability and hence greater opportunity to take precautions is afforded.
Annotations 22 A.L.R.2d 292, 408. Further
the character of sunlight per se in a context of
sunrise and sunset yields an inference of a
more inclusive visual impairment, and expect·
ably so, than that resulting from oncoming
headlights. Consequently, impairment of vis·
ion caused by sunlight should require an even
greater degree of care on the part of the driver
as more opportunity to react and adjust to the
adverse visual conditions is present than when
one's vision is suddenly and momentarily im·
paired by oncoming headlights.
"Drivers who failed to reduce their speed
when sunlight impairs their vision have been
8

held contributorily negligent as a matter of
law." (Cites omitted)
The facts in the instant case compel the conclusion that Mrs. Brock's conduct comes within the language and the holdings of the cases and authorities
discussed above. When Mrs. Brock was within 100150 feet of the parked truck, she was hit with an increased glare of the sun, and yet without reducing
her speed or moving her car to the left (although admittedly she had ample room) she proceeded down
the road for several seconds before impact while her
eyes were adjusting to the sun's glare (R 149, 150,
140, 141). This was no sudden emergency situation,
since she had been experiencing a glare for at least
one-quarter of a mile previous to this time, and then
had experienced a brighter glare, as has been indicated, for the last 100-150 feet before impact.
A series of Utah cases have held that in situations such as the instant case where a dangerous condition has been created, and a later actor comes along
and observes the condition or couldn't help but observe the condition but fails to avoid it, then the negligence of the second actor is the sole proximate cause
of the accident. In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.,
1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, where this rule was
first formulated, this court said at page 292:
'''Where a negligently created pre-existing condition combines with a later act of negligence causing an injury, the courts have
drawn a clear cut distinction between two
classes of cases. The first situation is where
9

has negligently created a dangerous con.
d1t10n ... and a later actor observed, or cir.
cumstances are such that he could not fail to
observe, but negligently failed to avoid it The
second situation involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it is too
late to avoid it. In regard to the first situation
it is held as a matter of law that the later in·
tervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut off the legal effect
of the negligence of the initial actor. This is
based upon the reasoning that it is not reasonably to be foreseen nor expected that one who
actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous
condition in ample time to avert injury will
fail to do so. On the other hand, with respect w
the second situation, where the second actor
fails to see the danger in time to avoid it, it is
held that a jury question exists. based on the
rationale that it can reasonably be anticipated
that circumstances may arise wherein others
may not observe the dangerous condition until
too late to escape it. The distinction is basically
one between a situation in which the second ac·
tor has sufficient time, after being charged
with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and
one in which the second actor negligently be·
comes confronted with an emergency situa·
tion."
In that case the defendant's truck driver had
parked his truck in front of his home in such a way
that the rear portion of the truck extended some 5
feet out into the paved portion of the eastbound lane
of the road. Plaintiff's intestate was in a car that
was traveling east at a speed greatly in excess of the
10

posted speed limit on that road. The driver of plaintiff's vehicle passed two cars and as he attempted to
pass a third, it turned to its left to avoid the parked
truck. At this point it was too late for plaintiff's vehicle to avoid a collision and it crashed into the left
rear end of the parked truck. The court characterized this as an emergency type situation and held that
the question of whether the second actor's negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the accident was a
question for the jury.

Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Interstate Motor Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d
989, involved a situation where one James Buckley,
traveling west, on Interstate 80, a new, divided highway, pulled his car off the highway and onto the
gravel beyond the 10 foot emergency strip because of
tire trouble. An Interstate truck stopped alongside
the Buckley car, partially in the 10 foot emergency
strip but with its back end protruding not more than
7 feet into the right traffic lane. This took place at
11 :00 P.M. The truck's clearance lights, stop lights
and blinkers were turned on and remained on. The
Greyhound Bus driver came along later and observed
the Interstate truck as he approached. He said he
first observed it about three-fourths of a mile away
and he realized that both the truck and the Buckley
car were stopped while he was still a half a mile away.
As the Greyhound Bus approached the scene, the evidence indicated the bus driver momentarily lost consciousness by either falling asleep or blacking out
11

from some other cause. He was aroused to consciousness just before the impact by the warning cry of a
woman passenger. He swerved the bus to the left but
not in time to avoid hitting the left rear corner of the
truck. The plaintiff is one of several passengers in.
jured in the collision.
The jury in this case returned a verdict against
both Greyhound and Interstate Motor Lines. The
trial court granted Interstate Motor Line's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and held
that Greyhound's negligence was the sole proximau
cause of the collision. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's ruling, said at page 991:

"* * * where there is a negligently creat·
ed hazard (Interstate parking the truck) and
a later actor (Greyhound) observed, or cir·
cum stances were such that he could not fail to
observe, the condition, but he nevertheless neg·
ligently failed to avoid it, the later negligence
would be an independent, intervening cause
and therefore the sole proximate cause of the
accident."
The Utah Supreme Court then goes on to say at
page 992:
"We think it is not reasonably to be fore·
seen that an oncoming driver (Greyhound)
would see (or fail to see) this large, well lighted truck so parked upon the highway, and with
at least one and one-half useable traffic
to his left nevertheless run into it. The trial
court was' correct in so concluding and enter·
ing a judgment in favor of Interstate Motor
12

Lines as a matter of law on the ground that
negligence of Greyhound was the sole proximate cause of the collision."
In the case now before this court it is undisputed
that the two southbound lanes of traffic were each
approximately 11 feet wide. These southbound lanes
were separated from the northbound lanes by a safety lane or median strip that itself was about 91h feet
wide ( R 164) . There was about 28 feet between the
left side of the Ward truck and the east side of the
median strip that could have been used by Mrs. Brock
(R. 164).
To use the language of the Supreme Court in
the Greyhound case,
We think it is not reasonably to be foreseen
that an oncoming driver (Mrs. Brock) would
see (or fail to see) this large truck so parked
upon the highway in broad daylight and with
at least one and one-half useable traffic lanes
(actually 28 feet) to the left of the truck, nevertheless run into it.
It should be noted tha:t in the Greyhound case the
Greyhound driver claimed that he in some strange
way lost consciousness just before getting to the Interstate Motor Lines truck. Nevertheless, the Utah
Supreme Court held his failure to avoid hitting the
truck that was there plainly to be seen was the sole
proximate cause of the accident. In the case now before this court, by plaintiff's own admission, there
were no vehicles between Mrs. Brock and the Ward
truck either in the outside southbound lane or the in13

side southbound lane. The safety zone or median strip
separating the north and southbound lanes, by plain.
tiff's own admission, was also without any vehicles
in it. There was nothing that distracted Mrs. Brock's
attention nor obstructed her view. For at least a quar.
ter of a mile she observed the Ward truck and knew
that it was stopped. She formed the opinion that it
was off the traveled portion of the roadway when she
first observed it and continued under this impression
down to the moment of impact. When she was 100·
150 feet away from the truck, the sun's glare was
somewhat brighter than it had been during the quar·
ter of a mile that she had traveled when she first noticed the truck, but during this 100-150 feet she
nevertheless could see the Ward truck and still
thought it was off the traveled portion of the high·
way just as she thought during the quarter of a mile
that she had just traveled. She did not slacken her
speed at all, nor did she move to the left but continued
in the outside southbound lane and drove into the left
rear duals of the Ward truck. All of this occurred on
a clear, dry, sunshiny day and at a time when there
was no traffic to interfere and nothing to distract
Mrs. Brock's attention. It seems clear that the ruling
of this court in the Greyhound case and in the other
cases cited herein must apply to the facts of the in·
stant case. If it does not apply, then a driver in broad
daylight and with no obstructions can, with impu·
nity, run into another vehicle that is there on the road·
way and can plainly be seen.
14

In the recent case of Anderson v. Parsons RedE-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45
(1970), a situation similar to the instant case occurred. I nthat case the plaintiff, as guardian of her 15
year old son, David, sued for injuries he suffered
when a car in which he was riding as a guest ran into
the rear of defendant's concrete mixing truck, which
was parked facing west on the north edge of 4th
North Street in Brigham City, Utah. At the time of
the accident the driver was washing out the mounted
platform which extended from the rear of the truck,
and which was used to unload concrete from the truck.
The evidence showed that the driver of the car in
which the plaintiff's son was a passenger, was heading north and had just completed a left hand turn to
the west onto 4th North in an effort to avoid a collision with another automobile. The driver over-accelerated and the car began to slide on some loose material on the surface of the road. When the car came
to within about 100 feet of the defendant's parked
truck, the driver had sufficiently regained control so
that he could have avoided the collision by proceeding
around the left side of the truck. The driver, however,
failed to observe the steel chute protruding from the
truck and collided with the extended chute causing
plaintiff's injuries. After presentation of plaintiff's
evidence, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of plaintiff's host driver. Relying on the rationale of Hill1!'5

yard, supra, this court affirmed, holding that the
sole proximate cause of the accident was the neg!i.
gence of the host driver. The court distinguished the
facts of the Hillyard case, however, by stating in 461
P.2 at 46:
"There [Hillyard] the host-driver was
following another car, which prevented him
from seeing the truck, which had been parked
with its rear end protruding onto the surfaced
part of the highway, until the preceding car
suddenly swerved around it. This created a
true emergency in which the negligence of the
host-driver ... concurred with the negligence
in parking the truck and causing the collision.
However, care was taken to point out therein
that 'where one has negligently created a dan·
gerous condition ... and a later actor observed,
or circumstances are such that in the exercise
of reasonable care he could not fail to observe,
but negligently failed to avoid it' his later neg·
ligence is the intervening and sole proximate
cause."
And further at p. 47, the court in support of its
conclusion that this was not the emergency type situ·
ation, stated by way of describing the accident:
"But accepting that further
plaintiff's own statement is that the driver
had regained control about 50 feet west of the
curb line (Main Street). He would then have
had about 100 feet in which to brake
turn aside and avoid the collision with this
large truck which stood there in plain sight.
Under any view whatsoever that may be taken
of those facts the trial court's conclusion that
16

the negligence of the host driver Kim Mortenson, was the sole proximate
of the collision is ineluctably correct."
In Anderson the driver saw the truck but did
not see the chute. In the case before this court Mrs.
Brock saw the truck for some time before impact but
just did not see it was right in her lane of traffic. 'The
truck and its position on the highway was there in
plain sight. Even at the time the sun seemed brighter
and more glary Mrs. Brock was still 100-150 feet
from the truck. She could still see it clearly. She still
thought it was off the roadway as she had thought
from the time she first observed the truck a quarter
of a mile away (R 150, 151). The sun becoming
brighter or more glary when she was 100-150 feet
from it changed nothing. Even if the sun became
brighter, she still could see the truck and had 100-150
feet within which to pull ever so slightly to the left
and the impact would never had occurred.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Brock made no effort to take any evasive
action of any kind, when confronted with the dangerous condition, which condition was observable to her,
or in the exercise of ordinary care must have been observable to her, (R 141). She did not alter her course
or speed when her vision became impaired (R 141).
The cases on point compel the conclusion that Mrs.
Brock's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the
accident or at least was a contributing cause barring
recovery.
17

The judgment in favor of plaintiff should
reversed and the trial court ordered, as a matter ol
law, to enter judgment in favor of defendants,
cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
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GLENN C. HANNI
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROGER DUTSON
1453 28th Street
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Attorneys for
Defendants-A ppellanu
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